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Abstract 
Most developing countries are characterized by large informal sectors, which are plagued by low 
productivity and other serious problems. This paper suggests a three-fold remedy for formalizing the 
large informal sector: formalization of property rights, alleviation of corruption and deregulation. In 
the case of India, which is studied in the paper, it is seen that the first two channels are more 
promising than the third one.  The paper also rejects the notion of discontinuation of informal 




A large informal sector is considered a drawback in an economy. There are several reasons 
for  this,  not  all  of  which  are  justified.  For  the rest  of  this paper  we  shall  consider  the 
informal sector as that part of the economy which is not regulated by the government. In 
India this is often referred to as the unorganized sector. 
       One  reason  why  a  large  informal  sector  is  considered  a  drawback  is  the  low 
productivity of the informal sector. In India the informal sector accounts for 90% of the 
total employment and 60% of the gross domestic product. Thus, the average product of 
labour is six times higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector. All other things 
remaining constant, a higher share of the formal sector in total employment should result in 
higher national income.  
Another  justification  given  for  the  reduction  of  the  informal  sector  is  less 
convincing. The informal and formal sector not only compete with each other in selling 
their products but also for space.  The informal milk vendor competes with formal milk 
processing companies in the consumer market. Rickshaws and cars compete for the same 
space on streets. This hampers the speed of cars, results in traffic jams and increases fuel   3
consumption. 
2Vendors  and  hawkers  crowd  the  streets,  disrupting  business  activity. 
Informal sector manufacturing enterprises belch smoke and pollutants make it difficult for 
the formal city dweller. In recent years in many developing countries the formal sector 
lobby  has  emerged  much  stronger  than  the  informal  sector  lobby.  As  a  result  many 
measures have been taken to limit the size of the informal sector. For example, the licensing 
of cycle rickshaws and vendors is one such measure. In the city of Delhi unlicensed cycle 
rickshaws  have  been  even  seized  by  the  authorities  and  vendors  have  been  forced  to 
discontinue their business.  
A large informal sector implies that policies of liberalization and globalization are 
less effective. When an economy liberalizes it is only the formal sector that comes into 
contact with the rest of the world. Foreign economies consider it too risky to transact with 
the informal sector.  Because the gains from liberalization are confined only to the formal 
sector a larger informal sector implies smaller gains.  
Entrepreneurs  operating  in  the  informal  sector  are  often  excluded  from 
policymaking or law making processes (Kuchta-Helbling-2000). This arrangement weakens 
check and balance mechanisms, potential opposition to the government and government 
accountability vis a vis the general public, thereby jeopardizing democracy (Louw, 1996). 
The production structure of informal activity weakens the power and influence of 
trade unions. Informal sector activity is characterized by heterogeneous and loosely linked 
production  units  with  multiple  intermediaries  between  workers  and  capital  (Kuchta-
Helbling, 2002). This  is  not  very conducive for  the formation of trade unions.  A  large 
informal working force waiting in the wings dilutes the bargaining power of formal sector 
workers  with  their  employers.  As  a  result  countries  with  large  informal  sectors  are 
characterized by poor working conditions in general. 
                                                            
2 On the other hand it must be pointed out that cars do nothing to add to the average vehicular speed in crowded areas.   4
 The discussion in the preceding paragraphs suggests two methods for controlling 
the size of the informal sector. One of them is formalization, which is motivated by the poor 
productivity of the informal sector. There are many aspects to formalization. A necessary 
condition  for  formal  production  is  formal  property  rights  on  the  land  on  which  the 
production unit operates.  The only exception to these is mobile service units providing 
services to consumers. An example of such mobile units is “vendors”. These use public 
property such as roads and parks even if they are formalized.  All business units, which are 
fixed in geographical space have to have formal property rights on the land that they occupy 
if they are to be classified as formal units. Thus, one way in which formalization of business 
and production activity can be achieved is the formalization of informal property rights.. 
However, even though formal property rights are a necessary condition for being classified 
as formal business enterprises these are not sufficient conditions for enterprises becoming 
formal. A large number of regulations have to be met by a formal sector unit. Sufficient 
proof  has  to  be  given  that  the  production/business  unit  is  well  equipped  to  meet  these 
regulations. Officially, if such poof is given then the relevant government authorities should 
be  compelled  to  provide  the  necessary  permits  which  pave  the  way  for  formalization. 
However, in practice this does not happen in many developing countries where officials 
have to be bribed to grant the necessary permits. The number of regulations is also an 
increasing function of the time lost in getting the necessary clearances.  Thus, it seems that 
corruption  and  regulation  are  stumbling  blocks  to  formalization.  Any  process  of 
formalization  is  therefore  dependent  on  processes  of  alleviation  of  corruption  and 
deregulation for its success.  
The  other  method  for  containing  the  size  of  the  informal  sector  is  forcible 
discontinuation of informal business, which is motivated by the conflict between formal and 
informal business activity.    5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section I we evaluate the forcible 
discontinuation  of  informal  business  activity.    In  Section  II  we  look  at  formalization. 
Section III analyses the Indian case. Section IV concludes.  
 
I. Forcible discontinuation of informal business activity 
                  In spite of the conflict between the formal sector and the informal sector the 
informal sector serves two important objectives: 
(i)  The employment objective: It provides employment to millions of persons, mostly migrants. 
Only  a  small  proportion  of  informal  workers  displaced  by  forcible  discontinuation  of 
informal  business  can  be  accommodated  by  the  formal  sector  and  the  corresponding 
expansion of markets for formal sector products, given that the labour output ratio in the 
formal  sector  is  much  lower.  In  other  words,  the  forcible  discontinuation  of  informal 
business  will  result  in  growing  unemployment.  Forcible  discontinuation  of  any  specific 
informal sector activity (such as rickshaw pulling) may not result in a decrease in the overall 
size  of  the  urban  informal  sector.  The  displaced  workers  will  turn  to  low  productivity 
occupations within the city. Return migration from the city to the rural areas will not be an 
outcome because  
(a)Return migration costs are quite significant given the low level of incomes. 
(b)The rural areas are in a state of stagnation and will be unable to generate any additional 
family income from the return of the displaced workers to their homes. (See Mitra, 2002 for 
details.) 
(ii)  The remittance objective: Earnings from the informal sector are remitted to the rural sector. 
In one survey remittances from informal sector workers actually amount to around 20% of 
their  incomes  and  are  used  for  agricultural  improvements,  rural  improvements  and 
consumption.   6
(iii)  In certain sectors like transport, the informal sector (e.g. cycle rickshaws) offer a pollution 
free alternative.  
 Below we analyse the remittance behaviour of individuals.  Our ultimate objective in this 
case is to look at the effectiveness of measures to control the size of the informal sector. But 
for that we have to look at the micro-economic analysis of the remittance behaviour of 
individuals.   
 
Micro-economic analysis of remittance behaviour of individuals     
I assume that the individual working in the informal sector not only cares about himself but 
also his family at home, though not to the same extent. To make matters simple assume that 
the  informal  sector  worker  only  has  one  family  member  in  the  rural  area.  The  utility 
function of the individual is given by  
                              1 0 ); ( ) ( 2 1 £ £ + + - a a r Y U r w U A  
where w denotes the informal sector wage and  A Y  denotes the income of the family member 
from agriculture. The level of remittances is denoted by r.  Thus, w-r  represents his own 
consumption and  YA+r represents his rural family member’s consumption.  
Maximizing this utility function with respect to r yields the following condition 
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Taking the total differential with respect to  A Y  and r yields 
 
                

















This implies that as agricultural income of the family member increases the remittance to 
the family member decreases. In other words the remittance objective gets diluted.    7
            What happens if the wage income decreases? A practical example is limiting areas 
in  which  rickshaws  and  cycle  vendors  can  operate,  leading  to  the  diminution  of  their 
incomes. Taking total differential with respect to w and r yields 
 














This implies that the amount of remittances made decrease as the informal wage decreases. 
             As  we  have  seen  that  remittances  are  used  for  agricultural  improvements.  This 
results  in  growth  of  agricultural  incomes.  With  growth  in  agricultural  incomes,  the 
remittance objective gets diluted. The resulting increase in post remittance income increases 
the prospects for entering the formal sector. Note that formalization has its costs in the form 
of fees for permits and investment in quality capital. Thus, there is a natural process of 
formalization. Now if the wage income in the informal sector decreases, remittances go 
down.  Agricultural  improvements  slow  down.  Slower  growth  of  agricultural  incomes 
implies  slower  decrease  in  remittances,  slower  increase  in post  remittance  incomes  and 
therefore slower formalization.  
            Thus, the basic conclusion of this section is that restricting the scope of informal 
business activity results in slower formalization.  
 
                                           II.    Formalization 
 Formalization of property 
As  we  have  mentioned  before,  formal  property  rights  over  land  is  a  precondition  for 
entering the formal business sector except in the case of mobile business. An important fact 
is that the people in the informal sector mostly do not have formal, legally recognized rights 
over the property they own: their land, their buildings and their businesses. In Delhi, the   8
capital of India, you see food kiosks and vendors and motor garages cropping up all over the 
place. The people operating these businesses do not have legal rights over the land capital 
and  the  business.  In  Latin  America  the  property  informally  held  by  the  poor  informal 
citizens  has  reached  a  bank  value  of  U.S.  $  500  billion.  Note  that  property  rights  are 
formalized when they are embodied in universally obtainable standardized instruments that 
are registered and governed by legal rules These instruments provide indisputable proof of 
ownership  which  informal  rights  do  not  provide.    Hernando  de  Soto  (read  his  articles 
mentioned in the references for a good insight into the informal property rights problem) 
estimates  that  around  75%  of  real  estate  parcels  in  developing  countries  do  not  have 
formalized titles. The assets held in the informal sector are dead capital. Because creditors 
do not have indisputable proof as to who owns them and therefore, they are not acceptable 
collateral for creditors. Thus, these cannot be used to obtain credit. Thus, the economy is 
denied a major source of credit.  The enormity of this denial is illustrated by the fact that  $ 
4 trillion dollars of credit is owed against formal property rights in the U.S. How can this 
dismal picture of most of the population having informal property rights be reversed?  The 
answer of course is formalization of property rights. Once people gain legal control over 
their property they gain the security to improve and develop the land. The capital value of 
the property increases, further enhancing the value of such property as collateral.  The lack 
of formal property rights and the resulting accountability problem implies that infrastructure 
suppliers are very cautious about supplying electricity and water to people with informal 
property rights. Indeed their attempts to supply electricity to such people have led to huge 
losses because of fraud, theft and lack of information about users. The very process of 
formalizing  property  rights  generates  information  that  can  be  fed  into  computers  and 
utilized later for security and development. The existence of informal rights in a large part 
of the economy limits the influence of computerization. Finally, the lack of security and   9
facilities which people with informal rights can avail implies that they are unwilling to 
undertake a great deal of improvement or development of their property.  
         Without  formal  property  rights  people  cannot  enter  the  formal  production  sector. 
Because the informal production sector is both limited in its consumer and credit base, the 
formal  sector  has  an  advantage  over  the  informal  sector.  One  must  realise  though  that 
formal  property  rights  are  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  entering  the  formal 
production/business  sector.    Once  formal  property  rights  exist,  entry  into  the  formal 
production/business sector is facilitated by a low level of corruption and the absence of 
excessive regulation.   
          How  should  the  government  aid  the  formalization  of  property?  When  squatters 
occupy a piece of land they arrive at private agreements as to how the land is to be divided 
and used. Government laws in developing countries often run counter to these agreements. 
What is required is that the government should pass laws that mimic these agreements so as 
to facilitate formalization.  This was done in 19
th Century America.  Migrants to the U.S. 
settled on vacant lands without government permission and established squatter colonies. In 
order to maintain peace and order they invented their own species of extralegal property 
rights such as “tomahawk rights”, “cabin rights” and “ corn rights”.  Tomahawk rights could 
be acquired by a person who had improved the land. These were displayed by deadening a 
few trees near the head of a spring and marking the bark of one or more trees with the 
initials of the person who made the improvement.  Cabin rights or corn rights could be 
acquired by raising a crop or building a log cabin. These extralegal rights could be bought 
sold and transferred just like official rights. The squatters fought many a battle with the 
government,  which  was  officially  opposed,  to  their  illegal  occupation  of  land.  In  their 
struggles  they  were  supported  by  politicians  who  genuinely  sympathised  with  them  or 
wanted to use them to meet their political ends. The long and bitter struggle culminated with 
the General Preemption Act of 1930 and its subsequent refinements. Land, which had been   10
improved by the squatter, was to be provided at a nominal rate ($ 1.25 per acre) to him. 
Only if he refused to purchase the land was a public auction to be conducted. Note that the 
Act mimicked the “Tomahawk rights”, “cabin rights” or “corn rights”. 
      Politicians and legislators in developing countries should try to acquire a knowledge of 
the informal property rights in operation in colonies of squatters and holders of property 
(which is not officially recognized as belonging to them). They should know how these 
rights are acquired and protected. Official laws should then be passed which try to mimic 
these informal property rights to the extent possible.  
 Other road blocks to formality 
  Acquiring  formal  property  rights  over  the  land  on  which  they  operate  do  not  assure 
individuals of the tag of formality in business.  A large number of other steps have to be 
obtained before an entrepreneur can enter the formal sector. 
 Entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector view the costs of entering the formal 
sector as prohibitive. A large numbers of procedures have to be gone through and permits 
obtained for entry into the informal sector. These require direct costs to be borne in the form 
of fees and bribes and indirect costs in terms of time. The time red tape costs are illustrated 
by the following example (Al Ahram Weekly, 2000) 
        Ahmed Abdel-Latif, a 24-year-old university graduate who lives in Heliopolis decided 
to put his savings in a private business and he chose to operate in a garage.  
       Abdel-Latif who opted for private business rather than standing in long queues waiting 
for a vacancy in a state body, was even more frustrated by the long procedures to obtain the 
long authorization to operate the garage. The long process involves obtaining permits and 
going through red tape in eight government departments. The lengthy process took him 223 
days during which he made 77 visits to government offices and received government officers 
from  the  Environmental  Affairs  Agency,  health  ministry  departments,  civil  defense 
department and other government offices.    11
       Abdel Latif points out with an informal calculation of the time red tape costs, he has 
lost around LE 9000, a very high figure if compared to the total capital of LE 5,500 he has 
put up as capital in the project. 
        Abdel Latif’s cost is just one of thousands that take place every day in Egypt and that 
ultimately lead people searching to make new business to prefer to go illegal and join the 
informal sector than go through all the lengthy procedures and costly steps of formalizing 
their business or their property holdings. 
        In the above example we just talked explicitly about the time costs of entry into the 
formal sector. Regulation or the need for obtaining government approvals or permits also 
provides scope for corruption. Many people are unable to pay the bribes resulting from such 
corruption. 
       The table in Appendix A provides data on informality (defined as the proportion of 
employment provided by the informal sector), the average number of procedures for entry 
into the informal sector and the Transparency international Index of corruption. The TI 
index of corruption ranges from zero (most corrupt) to ten (least corrupt). It is called the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The degree of informality in Azerbaijaan is 50.7%, the 
number of procedures is 15 and the corruption index is 1.7. Czech Republic has a much 
smaller  informal  sector  which  could  possibly  be  attributed  to  its  lower  number  of 
procedures  (10)  and  a  much  cleaner  government  (TI  index  of  4.6).  However,  mere 
speculation or intuition is not enough. In the next sub-section we construct a theoretical 
model which looks at the impact of corruption and regulation on the size of the informal 
sector. This also helps us to develop insights that would not be possible through verbal 
analysis.  In  the  following  sub-section  we  check  the  validity  and  significance  of  the 
theoretical results through regression analysis.  
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A. A Theoretical model 
        Why would somebody desire to enter the formal sector instead of the informal sector 
when people in the formal sector have to pay taxes and those in the informal sector  do not? 
This is because it is mostly the formal sector which has access to government and private 
sector  services:  credit,  infrastructure  services,  trade  fairs,  employee  training  e.t  .c.  The 
informal  sector  has  no  recourse  to  the  law  and  justice  system  to  enforce  contracts  and 
defend their property rights. Employees in the informal sector do not have a safety net in the 
form of employee insurance and pension systems.  
       By classifying a particular enterprise as formal the government also gives it its seal of 
approval.  This  seal  of  approval  is  a  great  advantage  in  negotiating  contracts.  Below  I  
describe a model of  entry into the formal sector with specific consideration given to the 
roadblocks presented by the involved government  servants.  
Assumptions of the model 
1)  There are N identical entrepreneurs in the economy. 
2)  Each entrepreneur has two options – to enter the informal sector or the formal sector. 
3)  Entry into the formal sector requires r permits, each issued by a government official. No    
requirement has to be met for entering the informal sector.  
4)  The proportion of government officials that are corrupt is c.  
5)  The sample of government officials met by any potential entrant into the informal sector 
is representative of the entire population of government officials. Thus, the proportion of 
corrupt government officials in the sample is also c.   
Deriving the demand curve for entry into the formal sector 
Let n denote the number of entrepreneurs that enter the formal sector. Then N-n denotes the 
total number of entrepreneurs that enter the informal sector. 
  Let p(n) denoted the maximized profit of an entrepreneur in the formal sector. Assuming 
that the law of demand applies and the marginal cost of production in the formal sector is   13
lower than that in the informal sector at all levels of output, it can be shown that the profit is 
decreasing in n for an oligopoly (see appendix for proof). Let F (N-n) denote the profit of 
an entrepreneur in the informal sector. It can be shown that F is decreasing in N-n under the 
same assumptions as above. The proof is exactly similar to that for p(n). 
         The  difference  in  profits  between  an  entrepreneur  in  the  formal  sector  and  its 
counterpart in the informal sector is given by  
                ) ( ) ( ) ( n N n n D - F - =p  
Let  ) ( ' n p  denote the derivative of p with respect to n and  ' F  denote the derivative of F 
with respect to N-n. The derivative of the profit differential is given by  
0 ' ' ) ( ' < F + =p n D  
Given the price of entry firms will enter the sector as long as the profit differential is 
greater  than  the  price  of  entry.  Given  that  D  (n)  is  decreasing  in  n,  it  follows  that  in 
equilibrium  
 D (n)=p 
where p is the price of entry. Since we can read off the number of entrepreneurs entering 
the formal sector from this equation given the price of entry this equation is the inverse 
demand curve for entry into the formal sector. And given the fact that D (n) is decreasing in 
n we can say that lower the price of entry greater the number of firms entering the formal 
sector. Thus, the demand curve for entry into the formal sector is downward sloping. 
 
Corruption, regulation and size of the informal sector 
 Given the number of regulations, the number of corrupt bureaucrats that the entrepreneur 
encounters  in  seeking  the  necessary  permits  is  rc.  The  marginal  revenue  curve  
corresponding  to  the  demand  curve  for  entry  into  the  formal  sector  is  also  downward 
sloping. Let this be denoted by MR (n). For the corrupt bureaucrat the marginal revenue   14
curve that he faces is MR (n)/rc. If C (n) is his cost of providing permits then the number of 
permits provided by him and therefore the number of firms entering the formal sector would 
be  






that is the bureaucrat’s marginal revenue is equated to his marginal cost.  If either r or c 
increases the bureaucrat’s marginal revenue curve shifts to the left (see figure where the 
marginal revenue curve shifts from MR/rc1 to MR/rc2). This leads to a decrease in n or the 
number of firms entering the formal sector. That is, an increase in the degree of corruption 
or regulation leads to a larger informal sector.  
Empirical Analysis 
We  now  examine  whether  the  empirical  influence  of  regulation  and  corruption  on 
informality is significant and consistent with our theoretical model. Corruption is measured 
by the corruption perception index (CPI) and regulation is measured by the average number 
of procedures needed to register a business. The CPI varies from 0 to 10 and is decreasing 

















































Table 1: Partial Correlation Coefficients 
  Informality   Procedures    CPI 
Informality    0.44  -0.64 
Procedures      -.2496 
CPI       
 
Our results imply that informality is positively correlated with the number of procedures 
(extent of regulation) and the degree of corruption. (Observe the negative correlation with 
the CPI, which is an inverse measure of corruption.). This is quite consistent with the results 
of our theoretical model.. However, we get some additional insights.  Further the number of 
procedures  (extent  of  regulation)  is  negatively  correlated  with  the  CPI  and  therefore 
positively correlated with the level of corruption. The logic is simple. Regulation provides 
bureaucrats  opportunities  for  corruption.  Lower  the  level  of  regulation,  lower  the 
opportunities for corruption. This is the direct effect. Further, lower the opportunities for 
corruption, lower is the incentive for corrupt people to enter the government service. This 
further  improves  the  integrity  of  government  servants.  This  is  the  indirect  effect  of 
deregulation on corruption and it takes place through a signaling mechanism.  
  We now look at the results of a regression of informality on (a) the numbers of procedures 
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                                            Table 2: Regression Results 
Statistics 
R-square: 0.50 
Adjusted R-square: 0.43 
Number of observations: 19 
Dependant  Variable:  Informality  (proportion  of  employment  provided  by  the  informal 
sector) 
Variable    Coefficient        t statistic 
Procedures   1.02       1.68* 
 CPI    -5.89       -3.1** 
 
Note: * denotes significance at 12 % level and ** at  1%  level. 
 
The results are extremely encouraging. The number of procedures has a significant positive 
effect on informality. A reduction in the number of procedures by 1 results in a decrease in 
the level of informality by 1.02%. Consider an economy like Belarus, which has a level of 
informality  of  around  40%  and  20  procedures.  If  Belarus  were  to  reduce  its  level  of 
procedures to that of Hungary (7) then its informality would be reduced to 27%.  Now 
consider  the  results  for  CPI.  CPI  has  a  negative  and  extremely  significant  effect  on 
informality. In other words corruption has a positive and significant effect on informality. 
The results imply that an increase in CPI by one reduces informality by 5.89%. In other 
words, India which has a level of informality of 90% and a CPI of 2.7 would see informality 
fall to 61% if the CPI is raised to 7.7, the level of Hong Kong. This is far below the level of 
9 and above enjoyed by some of the Western countries.  Continuing with our Belarus story,   18
if it supplemented the reduction of procedures to 7 with an increase in CPI by 4 points (3.4 
to 7.4) then it would reduce informality to the level of 3%.  
III. The Indian Case 
 
     We now apply our findings in Section II to the Indian case. What is the extent of informal property 
in India? To my knowledge no survey has been conducted to assess the magnitude of informal 
property in India. But driblets of information seem to suggest that a large amount of land, residential 
and business property is informally/illegally held: 
a) 15 to 25 percent tenancies in the country are illegal and concealed (Deshpande). 
b) Estimates of illegal encroachment upon private and public land run into thousands of acres 
across the country (Agrawal,2002) 
c) In Bombay there are 32,000 families living in illegal hutments close to the railway lines just 
because of a lack of an alternative place to live (Marquand, 2000). The Borivali National 
Park  has  around  70,000  illegal  worker  dwellings.  Given  that  55  percent  of  Bombay’s 
thirteen million populations lives in slums (many of which are illegal), even if we assume 
that only half of them are squatters then we arrive at a figure of 3.5 million living in illegal 
dwellings. In 2000 tens of thousands of huts were bulldozed. According to reliable estimates 
the average equity lost when a hut is bulldozed is 1100 dollars (55, 000 rupees). If in a year 
ten thousand huts are bulldozed a total of 55 crores in equity is destroyed in the city of 
Bombay alone.  In Delhi around 30% (which is a conservative estimate) of the population 
has only informal rights over the land which they inhabit. (Figure derived from proceedings 
of the seminar on “Sustainable Development of Delhi”, 2003.) How can this woeful state of 
affairs be changed? 
The answer is twofold: 
a)  Legalize informal property in places where they do not pose a nuisance to public life and 
a threat to the lives of dwellers themselves. In allocating formal property rights the system   19
of  informal  property  rights  already  in  place  should  be  mimicked  so  as  to  minimize 
displacement.  
b)   In places where the above stated conditions for formalization are not met, resettlement 
policies (as advocated by the World Bank) with suitable resettlement policies should be 
avoided. 
Combating Corruption 
Our theoretical model has established that corruption is an important factor that encourages 
informality?  What then can be done to tackle the corruption problem? One approach is to 
try to solve the signalling problem that attracts corrupt people to government service. A 
reduction in regulation reduces the potential opportunities for corruption in government. 
The consequence is that many corrupt people will no longer be attracted to government 
service. The second signalling problem is corruption at the entry points of the government 
service. People often have to pay hefty amounts to get a job (as illustrated by the Punjab 
Public  Service  Commission  Scandal).  Often  this  implies  that  debts  have  to  be  incurred 
which have to be paid back through corrupt practices (N. Narayanaswamy et. al, 2000). 
Again this implies that potentially corrupt applicants enter the government service.  Thus, it 
is very necessary that the officials who determine entry into the government service are 
clean.  This can be done by careful scrutiny of their records before choosing them and 
having monitoring mechanisms in place.  Ensuring that the entry points into the government 
service are clean will lower the level of corruption in the entire government service.  It is 
also more cost effective than the method of policing all government servants.  
     A  Transparency  International  report  says  that  the  cause  of  corruption  in  India  is 
definitely  not  the  low  salary  of  government  officials.  Rather  it  is  the  lack  of  effective 
deterrence in the form of punishment.  Sondhi (2000) says that the corrupt are rarely caught 
and even if caught are let off with minor penalties. The inordinate delays in corruption cases 
imply that punishment is often never meted out. The conviction rate in Indian courts is 6%.   20
There are three crore cases pending in the Indian courts and average time taken for disposal 
of cases varies from 10 to 20 years.  
      Another reason for lack of effective punishment in corruption cases is that in the initial 
stages it is the government officials themselves who decide whether the corruption case 
against  their  fellow  government  officials  will  be  pursued  or  not.  Solidarity  among 
government officials ensures that these cases are often dropped.   
    In order to ensure effective punishment in corruption cases judicial judgements should be 
speeded up and the initial groundwork in assessing a corruption case should be done by an 
independent body.  
     The development of civil society can act as an effective tool against corruption. Civil 
society is considered as the realm of association between the government and the state and 
consists of professional organizations, formal and informal non-profit associations. They are 
a  useful  means  for  aggregating  societal  interests,  ensuring  social  participation  in  state 
governance and the promotion of democratic values. They can help in combating corruption 
by  creating  pressure  for  improved  governance,  exposing  corruption  and  monitoring  the 









        
                          Box 1: Suggested Measures for Reducing Corruption in India 
 
 
·  Reduce Regulation 
·  Make entry points into the government service clean 
·  Resolution of  corruption cases by independent body 
·  Speeding up judicial judgements 
·  Encouraging civil society 
·  Increasing the use of e-governance   21
One  of  the  major  contributions  of  the  civil  society  is  to  create  public  awareness  about 
corruption. Bhatia and Dreze (1998) describe one such attempt by a civil organization called 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangsthan (MKSS) to expose corruption in rural Rajasthan. In one 
day in a public hearing in Surajpara village corruption worth Rs 5 lakhs was exposed. The 
hearing was marked by its constructive and orderly tone. Some of the officials involved in 
the corruption cases accepted blame. There were even some who promised to refund the 
corruption proceeds.  This public hearing by MKSS highlights the important role that the 
civil society can play in combating corruption. 
       The role of the civil society is just not restricted to organizing public hearings. For 
example,  the  Public  Affairs  Centre  in  Bangalore  has  developed  the  “Report  Card 
Methodology” to track down and expose corruption in public services. This methodology 
provides a report on the state of corruption in various sectors of government at regular 
intervals. Each survey is followed by extensive dissemination and discussion. Transparency 
International India has played a significant role in fighting corruption through Gandhian 
methods of non-violent mass mobilization. 
      Our interest is in combating corruption at the entry points to the formal sector. The 
success of civil society organizations in exposing and checking corruption in other fields 
implies  that  they  can be  useful  in  checking  corruption in  the provision  of  licenses  and 
permits  for  formal  businesses.  Civil  society  organizations  in  India  are  at  he  moment 
scattered  and  not  linked  by  a  network.  An  increase  in  the  number  of  civil  society 
organizations  and  good  networking  by  them  is  desirable.  Worldwide  organizations  like 
Transparency International can help in this regard.  
      Another  new  method  of  reducing  corruption  is  e-governance.  Under  e-governance 
people  can  get  their  forms  cleared  or  permits  issued  on  the  internet  and  the  chance  of 
suffering at the hands of corrupt government officials can be reduced. It would also mean 
that project proposals of applicants to the formal sector would be displayed in a web-site.   22
Any  corruption  or  abuse  can  therefore  be  detected.  E-governance  has  had  outstanding 
success in a village called Bellandur in Karnataka. Computerization has reportedly reduced 
corruption and reduced delays. Revenue loopholes have been plugged as all the records are 
available at the click of a button. People are getting their land registered in record time. 
While we are interested in eliminating corruption at the entry points to the formal sector the 
success of Bellandur’s experience with e-governance implies that such methods can be used 
in determining the entry of firms into the formal sector.  
      Another  contribution  of  e-governance  is  making  the  Central  Vigilance  Commission 
more accessible to the public. The development and use of an interactive web-site is a step 
in the right direction. The interaction between the network of civil society organizations and 
the NGO could be an important mechanism for detecting and punishing corruption.  
      Regular surveys and estimates of corruption are an important input into programmes for 
combating  corruption.  An  approach  in  this  regard  has  been  developed  by  Kaufmann, 
Pradhan and Rytermann of the World Bank (1998). The methodology consists of directly 
surveying customers of public services to obtain estimates of bribery in various government 
departments.  The  social  and  economic  costs  of  corruption  in  each  department  are  then 
computed. A priority list of departments for the reduction of corruption is constructed. For 
the problem of concern in our paper, an estimate of bribery by the Industries Centres can be 
made by surveying the people who have applied for starting a formal business in the recent 
past.  This would enable to construct a priority list of regions for tackling the problem of 
corruption.   
Case study of registration of small businesses in India 
We now look at the procedures involved in starting a small formal business in India. This 
will throw some light on the existing road blocks to formalization given that people in the 
informal sector mostly endeavour to enter the small formal sector. Small formal businesses 
are selected because they are potential absorbers of previously informal entrepreneurs and   23
work force. This case study is based on a note by Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur 
and Small Industries Development Bank of India (2003). A small scale industry is defined 
as  one  in  which  the  investment  in  plant  and  machinery  is  less  than  one  crore.  When 
investment is less than Rs 25 lakhs it qualifies as a “Tiny Sector” SSI. An industry can be 
started by the entrepreneur at either his own place/ own shed or rented place/ rented shed. 
This  suggests  that  formally  held  residential  property  can  be  used  to  start  SSIs.  Thus, 
formalization  of  residential  land  and  residential  property  discussed  above  can  give  an 
impetus to industrialization. An industry can also be located at an industrial estate.  
        The procedures involved in setting up a small scale industry are as follows: 
a) Issue  of  a  provisional  registration  certificate  (PRC)  by  the  District  or  Tehsil  Industries 
Sector: In order to get a PRC the following information has to be provided in the form of a 
short project report: background of the entrepreneur, plant and machinery to be bought and 
its value. Details of where the product would sell and at what price and sources of funds 
have to be included.  
b) Permission of local authority to set up the industry 
c) Trade License  
d) Power Sanction  
e) Pollution clearance  
f)  Clearance of inspector of Boilers 
g) Registration of Commercial taxes  
h) Permanent  Registration  Certificate  (PMT):  Having  set  up  the  unit  and  achieved  trial 
production the entrepreneur has to get the PMT. In order to get the PMT copies of all the 
clearances stated above along with a lease/rental agreement and affidavit are required. 
          There  might  be  some  procedures  that  are  not  listed  by  the  study.  However,  the 
number of listed procedures is 8 that compares quite favourably with those required in the 
transition  economies  where  Hungary  has  the  minimum  of  seven  procedures.  There  is,   24
however, a room for reduction of procedures. The local body should respect the PRC so that 
procedure (b) can be done away with. Pollution clearance and clearance of inspector of 
boilers  can  be  merged  into  one.  Once  the  PRC  is  issued  there  should  be  no  need  for 
applying afresh for a power sanction and a trade license. The information provided for the 
power sanction and trade license could be included in the application for PRC.  
        Thus, the number of procedures can be reduced by 4. Given the results of the empirical 
study  this  implies  that  the  level  of  informality  reduces  by  4  percentage  points.  The 
requirement that a rental/lease agreement has to be produced for the issue of a PMT stresses 
the importance of formalization of property. However, a reduction by four percentage points 
is totally inadequate for India where the level of informality is around 90%.  Thus, it seems 
that reduction of corruption and formalization of property rights should be the main vehicles 




A large informal sector is often considered a drawback in an economy.  The productivity of 
the informal sector is mostly much lower than that of the formal sector. In India formal 
productivity is six times that of informal productivity. Therefore, formalization (conversion 
of  parts  of  the  informal  sector  into  formal  production  units)  can  increase  the  level  of 
national product as well as speed up the rate of economic growth.  There are other reasons 
why a large informal sector may not be desirable.  The informal sector often competes with 
the  formal  sector  both  in  terms  of  business  activity  and  space.  Informal  units  in  many 
sectors are heavily polluting and are a major health hazard. The impact of globalization and 
liberalization gets diluted in the presence of a large informal sector as this sector is virtually 
untouched by these policies. The success of democratic institutions and policy making gets 
hindered in the presence of a large informal sector.    25
     One way to reduce the size of the informal sector is through physical controls- banning 
certain  kinds  of  informal  activity  or  limiting  their  area  of  operation.  For  example,  the 
government might ban street vending in a city or limit the areas in which cycle rickshaws 
operate.   Banning certain types of informal activity will not usually result in a smaller 
overall size of the informal sector.  The banned workers usually take recourse to lower 
productivity occupations because of high return migration costs and stagnation of economic 
activity  in  their  native  villages.  These  villages  therefore  cannot  accommodate  them. 
Limiting the sphere of certain types of informal activity actually hinders the process of 
natural formalization.  The workers who are so restricted experience a decline in their wage. 
Any  decline  in  wage  results  in  a  decline  in  remittance  income.  Because  much  of  the 
remittance income is used for agricultural improvement a decline in remittances will result 
in a decline in agricultural growth.  This implies that families of migrants who find work in 
the informal sector might be dependent on remittances for a longer period of time.  This 
tendency hurts of formalization which might result from the process of natural accumulation 
of savings and human capital formation.  
      Given that physical controls might not be successful in limiting the size of the informal 
sector this paper suggests certain measures for formalization. It is seen that an increase in 
the level of regulation (and therefore the number of regulating bureaucrats that the potential 
entrant into the formal sector has to tackle) and the degree of corruption leads to an increase 
in  the  number  of  claimants  for  bribes  for  entry  into  the  formal  sector.  For  a  given 
willingness to pay an increase in the number of claimants would mean smaller bribe income 
for each claimant.  Because of this fact the number of entrants into the formal sector is 
restricted.  
     Our  empirical  analysis  shows  that  corruption  and  regulation  are  indeed  significant 
determinants of informal sector size. An increase in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
by one point (which results in a cleaner bureaucracy) reduces informality (the share of the   26
informal  sector  in  total  employment) by  5.89%.  Similarly,  a  decline  in  the number  of 
procedures by one reduces informality by 1.02%.  
     A reduction in the extent of regulation/ procedures requires legislative changes. As seen 
in the case study on small scale industries in India the number of procedures is already quite 
small.  A  reduction  by  4  procedures  is  possible  which  will  reduce  informality  by  4%.  
However, the level of corruption is very high. If it is raised from its current level of 2.7 to 
7.7  (the  level  of  Hong  Kong)  then  our  empirical  analysis  predicts  that  the  level  of 
informality will decline by as much as 29%.  Thus it seems that alleviation of corruption 
might be more important than further deregulation in India in the context of formalization.  
Several methods have been recommended in the literature for reducing corruption.  This 
paper suggests a few methods that are suitable for India. One is to ensure that the people 
manning the entry points into government service are clean. This is a good signal for clean 
people to enter government service as they do not have to pay bribes, which have to be 
recovered later through corrupt bureaucratic action.  Setting up an independent body (which 
is not influenced by bureaucrats) to pursue corruption cases is another suggestion. Speedy 
resolution of corruption cases can also act as a deterrent.  The development of civil society 
can serve as an effective tool against corruption. The civil society can help in combating 
corruption  by  creating  pressure  for  improved  governance,  exposing  corruption  and 
monitoring the state’s actions for fighting corruption and abuse.  Finally, e-governance can 
reduce the chances of applicants to the formal sector suffering at the hands of bureaucrats 
by introducing transparency and reducing bureaucratic discretion.  
    While it might be necessary to reduce corruption and regulation to promote formalization, 
a necessary condition for entry into the formal sector is the possession of formal property 
rights.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the population is tied to their property by 
just informal property rights. The lack of formal property rights is a stumbling block to 
entry into the formal production sector.  The formalization of property rights is a major   27
challenge before the government and has to take place if we are to bring about a major 
increase in the size of the Indian formal economy. A significant lesson is to be learnt from 
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Appendix A 
Table: Informality, procedures and corruption 
  Informality Procedures  Corruption 
Armenia  40.3  11  2.5 
Azerbaijaan  50.7  15  1.7 
Belarus  40.9  20  3.4 
Bulgaria  30.4  10  3.3 
Croatia  27.4  13  2.7 
Czech Rep  12.6  10  4.6 
Georgia  53.2  12  2.3 
Kazakhstan  20.9  12  2.3 
Kyrgyzstan  33.6  9  2.2 
Latvia  29.4  7  3.4 
Lithuania  29.6  11  3.8 
Moldavia  35.1  11  2.6 
Poland  20.9  11  4.2 
Romania  24.3  11  3.3 
Russia  40.9  18  2.4 
Slovakia  16.3  11  3.7 
Slovenia  21.6  8  6 
Ukraine  41.2  13  2.6 
Uzbekistan  33.2  7  1.8 
 
Source: Informal Economy Round Table, Sofia (2002). 
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Appendix B 
Proposition:  Assume  that  the  law  of  demand  applies  and  that  all  firms  in  the  formal 
(informal) sector are identical. Further, assume that the marginal cost of production in the 
formal sector is lower than that in the informal sector at all levels of output. Then, the 
maximized profit of a typical firm in the formal sector is decreasing in the number of firms 
in that sector. 
Proof: The profit of a typical firm i in the formal sector is given by 
           ) ( ) ( i i i q c q Q P - = p                                                                                             (i) 
where Q is the total industry output, P denotes price of output and i q denotes output of firm 
i. By the law of demand,  ) (Q P¢ is negative. Firm i chooses output  i q  to maximize profits. 
Because all firms in the formal sector are assumed to be identical, q* can denote the profit 
maximizing  quantity  of  any  firm  in  the  formal  sector  where  the  total  output  is 
] ˆ ) ( * [ q n N nq Q - + =  and q ˆ  is the profit maximizing output in the informal sector. The first 
order condition can therefore be expressed as  
           0 q c Q P q Q P = ¢ - + ¢ *) ( ) ( * ) ( .                                                                             (ii) 
Differentiating equation (ii) with respect to n yields                                                                                    
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Equation (iii) can be rearranged to yield  
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 If  ) (Q P¢ ¢  is negative then the term in square brackets on the left hand side is negative. To 
determine the sign of this term when  ) (Q P¢ ¢  is positive, note that that the total revenue of 
the entire industry is given by   31
           TR=P(Q)Q                                                                                                         (v) 
and marginal revenue is 
   
           ) ( ) (
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MR + ¢ = = .                                                                        (vi) 
The derivative of marginal revenue with respect to Q is given by 
   














.                                                                        (vii) 
It is a well-known result that  dQ MR d / ) (  is negative. Therefore, the term in brackets in 
equation (vii) is also negative. For positive  ) (Q P¢ ¢ , both  2 Q Q P / ) ( ¢ ¢  and  * ) ( q Q P¢ ¢  are 
positive. Moreover,  2 Q Q P / ) ( ¢ ¢  is larger in magnitude than  * ) ( q Q P¢ ¢  for n 2 ³ . Given that 
the term in brackets in (vii) is negative it follows that  ) ( * ) ( Q P q Q P ¢ + ¢ ¢  is also negative. 
  To summarize,  ) ( * ) ( Q P q Q P ¢ + ¢ ¢  is negative irrespective of the sign of  ) (Q P¢ ¢ . Because 
the term in brackets in the right hand side of (iv) is positive, it follows that dq*/dn and 
dQ/dn are of opposite signs. 
Given that the marginal cost of production in the formal sector is lower than in the 
informal sector at all quantities, it follows that q ˆ  is less than q*. The proof that  dn q d / ˆ  and 
dQ/dn are of opposite signs is exactly similar to the proof that dq*/dn and dQ/dn are of 
opposite signs. 
  Given that the signs of both  dn q d / ˆ  and dq*/dn are opposite to the sign of dQ/dn, it can 
be  inferred  that  dn q d / ˆ   and  dq*/dn  are  of  the  same  sign.  Differentiating 
q n N nq Q ˆ ) ( * - + =  with respect to n yields  
   











) ˆ * ( - + + - = .                                                             (viii)  
If  dn q d / ˆ  and  dn dq / *  are of positive sign then by (viii) dQ/dn is also positive. However, 
this contradicts the finding that the signs of  dn q d / ˆ  and dq*/dn are opposite to the sign of 
dQ/dn.    32
Let us now examine the possibility that at least one out of  dn q d / ˆ , dq*/dn and dQ/dn 
is equal to zero. From (iv) if dq*/dn is zero then dQ/dn is zero and vice-versa. Similarly, if 
dn q d / ˆ  is zero then dQ/dn is zero and vice-versa. Thus, if one out of  dn q d / ˆ , dq*/dn and 
dQ/dn is equal to zero then all three are zero. However, this finding and equation (viii) 
implies that (q*-q ˆ ) is zero when at least one out of  dn q d / ˆ , dq*/dn and dQ/dn is zero. This 
contradicts our earlier finding that (q*-q ˆ ) is positive. Thus, the case that at least one out of 
dn q d / ˆ , dq*/dn and dQ/dn is zero is ruled out. 
Given three facts,(i) dn q d / ˆ  and dq*/dn have the same sign, which is opposite to the 
sign of dQ/dn, (ii) the case that at least one out of  dn q d / ˆ , dq*/dn and dQ/dn is zero is ruled 
out and (iii) the case that  dn q d / ˆ  and  dn dq / *  are of positive sign is ruled out, it follows 
that both  dn q d / ˆ  and dq*/dn have negative signs and dQ/dn has a positive sign. 
  The maximized profit of a firm in the formal sector is given by 
              *) ( * ) ( * q c q Q P - = p .                                                                                    (ix) 
The derivative of  * p  with respect to n is given by 
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Adding and subtracting  ) / * ( * ) ( dn dq q Q P¢ from the right hand side of (x) and rearranging 
yields 
   


































.   (xi) 
The  second  term  in  square  brackets  vanishes  because  of  the  first  order  condition  in 
equation (ii). Thus,  
   















.                                                                        (xii)   33
Here,  ) (Q P¢  and dq*/dn are negative whereas dQ/dn is positive. Therefore,  dn d / * p  is 
negative. In other words, the maximized profit of a typical firm in the formal sector is 
decreasing in the number of firms in that sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 